Self-Expression

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For Lori

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speech act shows her assertoric commitment to [[John thinks that snow is white]]. Ignoring the complication presented by the connective 'and' in the second parenthetical, the thesis that '__, as Mary denies,' is a weak indicator of assertoric commitment explains why one putting forth (7) in a speech act shows her assertoric commitment to [[Mary denies that Snow is white]].

As an example of one parenthetical attitudinative nesting within another, we have,

(8)   If [snow is white]$_i$, [[as]$_i$ John, [as]$_{ii}$ we all know, thinks]$_{ii}$, then grass is green.

In light of the Emonds Transformation (see note 19), we take it that [[NP, as NP□ V$_s$, VP]]=[[NP VP, as NP□ V$_s$]], whence

f [[...If [snow is white]$_i$, [[as]$_i$ John, [as]$_{ii}$ we all know, thinks]$_{ii}$, then grass is green ...]].

$= f$ [[...If [snow is white]$_i$, [[as]$_i$ John thinks]$_{ii}$, [as]$_{ii}$ we all know, then grass is green ...]].

The hypothesis that '__, as John thinks,' is a weak indicator of assertoric commitment explains why a speaker uttering (8) in a speech act shows her assertoric commitment to [[John thinks that snow is white]]. The hypothesis that '__, as we all know,' is a weak indicator of assertoric commitment implies that a speaker uttering (8) in a speech act shows her assertoric commitment to

[[We all know that [as]$_i$ John thinks]].

But as we have observed, [[[as]$_i$ John thinks]]=[[John thinks that snow is white]], whence a speaker uttering (8) shows her assertoric commitment to

[[We all know that John thinks that snow is white]].

Parenthetical attitudinatives, then, possess semantic content, and indeed truth conditions, while also playing an expressive role. We thus cannot infer, from the premise that an expression has semantic content, to the conclusion that it can't also be a device of self-expression.

7
Expressive Qualities

In self-expression we show what's within, sometimes overtly, sometimes involuntarily, and at other times in ways that are between these two extremes. In certain cases we show what's within by showing *that* things are thus and so within us; in other cases we show what's within by making some aspect of what's within literally perceptible. I have been promising for many pages to explain and substantiate a third way in which we show what's within, namely by showing how some aspect of our experience feels. Now it's time to make good on that promise.

Evidence might show me that a friend is in a state of anguish without enabling me to know how she feels. Showing-that, that is, might justify my belief about how things are with someone without enabling me to know how that situation feels to her. The same goes for showing-α: Nothing in our account of part-whole perception, and the way in which we've invoked it to support the claim that emotions can be literally perceived, implies that a person perceiving an emotion will know how that emotion feels. For all we know, a Vulcan such as Mr. Spock can perceive an emotion on the face of a human being without having the faintest clue what that emotion feels like. Spock may be able to come to her aid in various ways but evidently will be unable to empathize with her.

We can enable others to perceive our experiential or emotional state without showing them how that state feels. Further, while when we show how something feels we in some cases demonstrate the presence of that state in us, we characteristically do more than this. In particular we characteristically enable others with the capacity for empathy to know what that state feels like. Such knowledge of how something feels is facilitated by affinities between sensations on the one hand, and emotions and moods on the other. Further, such knowledge is not limited to knowledge of emotion. It could also convey information about how one's experience feels, including even perceptual experience. Accordingly, the present chapter will enable

us to make progress on a question raised in Chapter 2 (under dictum 2.1.7) concerning the extent to which experiential states (pains, sensations, etc.) can be shown, and thus the extent to which they can be expressed.

Neither showing-that nor showing-α shows how someone's emotion or experience feels. Since inference from evidence and perception are the most intensely studied sources of knowledge in the cognitive sciences, one might wonder whether anything at all could show me how someone else's emotion or experience feels. What's more, if I try to find out by having that emotion or experience myself, I might remain in doubt as to whether what I feel is at all like what she or he feels. In this chapter I will first (7.1) explain that notion of showing more germane to skill than either propositional or perceptual knowledge. In 7.2 I then forward a theory that helps to account for this by hypothesizing a common three-dimensional space into which we can map both emotions and experiences. This puts us in a position, in 7.3, to account for a form of showing what's within that involves sharing the phenomenal character of an emotion or experience. That in turn helps us to understand how self-expression facilitates empathy, and I offer an account of this connection in 7.4. On that basis I also consider in 7.5 some theories of expression in the arts, focusing primarily on musical expression. I canvass some major theories of this kind and offer an alternative that I argue to be superior to all of them. I also offer an account in 7.6 of how representational art can be expressive without depicting anything that is itself expressive.

7.1. Showing how

One way to learn how to do something is to be shown how to do it. You might show me how to tie a shoe, how to find a constellation in the night sky, or how to calm down in a stressful situation.[1] In the first case you might give a visual demonstration of what to do with laces. In the second case you show me where to point the telescope and what configuration to look for. In the third case you might show me how to imagine a situation

[1] You might show me, and with luck I will learn. A teacher might show a class how to do integration but the students might be too bored or dense to grasp what she has taught. Accordingly, from the fact that A shows B how to do something, it does not follow that B thereby comes to know how to do it. In this respect showing how is like showing that.

that would be relaxing; perhaps I am to envision walking on cool green moss, or sitting on a beach with waves lapping my legs. If I do my work as a pupil, what I learn from teaching of these kinds will be skills, know how, rather than, or at least not just, knowledge that.

You teach me how to do something, and if I am doing my job as a student I will come to know how to do it. You might codify that lesson in a book or in some other artifact. A geometry book will show me how to prove a theorem. If I grasp what it teaches then I will know how to prove that theorem. A recipe book will show me how to cook a soufflé. Here too if I grasp what it teaches I will know how to cook a soufflé. Observe that in both cases, reading the book might not be enough for me to learn how; I may have to practice the theorem or soufflé a few times before I get it right. Know-how is often only possible with some practice.

Consistent with our pattern thus far, a painting might show me how a certain man's hair is colored, and if I have appropriate perceptual apparatus I will thereby learn how it is colored. That is only possible if the sitter's hair is so colored, and only if the painter and other aspects of the transmission of information are reliable. If all these things are in place, then I can learn how that man's hair is colored. If I retain this knowledge I will be able to discriminate this color from others. That is a skill that I might retain for a while and then lose, and when I lose that skill it will no longer be true that I know the color of the man's hair except, at best, propositionally ("It's russet"). Further, if I learn what his hair looks like, then I might be able to visualize that color in both his and his picture's absence. However, this ability to visualize is not a necessary condition of my knowing that color. (I know what sulfur smells like without its being the case that I can "olfactorily" image that smell, and I know what fuschia looks like without my being able to form a mental image of that hue.) We will see below that just as empathizing is something that we do rather than something that befalls us, to empathize with another it is not enough that we have had some experience of what they are going through. In addition to knowing what they are going through, we must "feel with them". The hard work comes in knowing how to elucidate the expression with which I've just shuddered.

A painting may not accurately and reliably portray the color of a man's hair. If it doesn't, then it doesn't convey knowledge of what his hair looks like. However, even in that case, it may still provide me with qualitative

knowledge, and thereby a skill, because it exemplifies the qualitative information that it also represents. It enables me to know what russet looks like because in looking at it I perceive that color. If I've never seen russet before, I learn something new. Further, even if I have seen that color before, this painting can activate that knowledge and thus provide me with the ability to visualize that color in its absence. So a painting can both provide knowledge and enable me to bring what I know into consciousness.

How distinct is knowledge how from knowledge that? One could try to conceptualize the aforementioned skills as knowledge that rather than knowledge how, suggesting, for instance, that knowing how to tie a shoe is just a matter of knowing that the way to tie a shoe is *this* (where one demonstrates the shoe-tying technique). Presumably here the shoe-tying demonstration is one that the knower must perform, rather than just pointing to someone else demonstrating the skill: A child does not demonstrate mastery of shoe-tying simply by pointing to an adult's demonstration of how it is done. But if this is correct, then knowledge-that in such cases presupposes a skill, precisely the skill exhibited in the aforementioned demonstration. For this reason, while knowledge-how may be analyzable in terms of propositional knowledge, that propositional knowledge itself presupposes a skill. Hence while knowledge-how may presuppose knowledge-that, it cannot be analyzed in terms of knowledge-that without remainder.[2]

Sensory experience typically gives us both knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Gazing at a mountain range I can learn how many peaks there are, what sort of vegetation they have, and whether there is evidence of recent fire. These are forms of knowledge-that. In addition, in gazing at the range I can acquire knowledge-how. For instance, I can learn what a particular combination of haze and vegetation looks like from a distance, or how a vast expanse of trackless wilderness looks. I learn how these things look; from other experiences I might learn how sulfur smells, how coconut tastes, or how a shark's denticles feel to the touch. In addition, knowledge

of how something looks, sounds, tastes, and so on, seems to equip us with a skill. If I know how the red of an apple looks, or how the sour of a lemon tastes, I know how to recognize that color by its look, and that taste by its flavor. Although the connection is less reliable, I might also know how to imagine the red of an apple or the sour taste of a lemon.[3] These are skills lacked by someone born blind and lacking the sense of taste.

Not only might perception show me how something looks, sounds, and so on, and thereby equip me with skills; it might also provoke in me, and thereby give me knowledge of, emotions and moods. In watching a small child get hit by a car I feel horror; in listening to the surf I feel calm. An unfortunate turn of events could show me how desperation feels; a fortunate one could show me ecstasy or serenity. In all these cases I learn how an emotion or mood feels if I did not already know, and these experiences have shown me how that emotion or mood feels. What is more, even if I did know how that emotion feels but this knowledge was dormant, such experiences might activate that knowledge in me. In either case, subsequent to the experience I will if my memory serves me right be possessed of a skill: as before, a skill of being able to recognize that feeling by how it feels.

This phenomenon of knowing how a feeling feels will consist in different things for different people, and might even vary over time for a single person. For instance, one person might come to recognize the onset of her anxiety by a creeping sensation in her skin; another might recognize the onset of his anxiety by a slight sense of vertigo. Again, a person might recognize his trepidation by an unusual appearance in an object of perception, as in this passage from John Cheever in which a man perceives the effects of his attempt to abstain from tobacco and alcohol:

On Sunday I sneaked seven cigarettes in various hiding places and drank two Martinis in the downstairs coat closet. At breakfast on Monday my English muffin started up at me from the plate. I mean I saw a face there in the rough, toasted surface. The moment of recognition was fleeting, but it was deep, and I wondered who it had been. Was it a friend, an aunt, a sailor, a ski instructor, a bartender or a conductor on a train? The smile faded off the muffin, but it had been there for a second—the sense of a person, a life, a pure force of gentleness and censure, and I

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[2] Stanley and Williamson 2001 argue that all alleged cases of knowledge-how are analyzable as cases of knowledge-that, while the converse relation of analyzability does not hold. However, their "analysis" appeals to what they call "practical modes of presentation", and as Rosefeldt 2004 points out, in lieu of an elucidation of this notion we cannot tell whether the putative analysis succeeds without remainder.

[3] The connection is less reliable because I can know how the sour of a lemon tastes without being able to imagine that sour taste in its absence. The point comes out even more clearly with the sense of smell. I know how sulfur smells, but may not be able to imagine smelling sulfur.

am convinced that the muffin had contained the presence of some spirit. As you can see, I was nervous. (Cheever 1960)

His seeming to perceive the face in the muffin shows the character (and us) how his anxiety feels or at least some aspect of that anxiety. On the other hand, not only would I not expect my anxiety to feel this way for me, it is also unlikely that this character's anxiety would feel the same way for him on another occasion. In contrast to the smell of sulfur or the taste of coconut, how a mood or emotion feels can take quite different forms for different people, and can change over time for one person.

As with the case of knowledge of how perceptual experiences feel, experiences of moods and emotions might also equip me with an ability to imagine how an emotion or mood feels; however, as before, the connection is a relatively loose one. Unless I am in a situation that elicits feelings of desperation or anxiety, I may have difficulty imagining that feeling. This is why some psychotherapists have in recent years begun using virtual reality devices to help patients face their phobias: those devices provide patients with experiences that they cannot call up through imagination or memory on their own, but that nevertheless enable them to face the fears that those experiences elicit.[4]

Just as what qualitative knowledge we acquire from experience depends upon our sensory capacities, so too what emotional knowledge we acquire from experience depends upon our physiological, as well as ambient emotional makeup. A child may know no lust even upon seeing what provokes lust in an adult. A sociopathic adult will feel no horror even as the vehicle smashes into the child. Perhaps, as we have suggested, Mr. Spock is capable of no emotion at all while having the same perceptual experience as human beings do. Less fancifully, different individual histories will result in one and the same experience triggering different affective responses in viewers: a certain smell will trigger a fond memory of a childhood event in me but not in you. Even taking into account these sorts of variation, we may still say that perception often activates emotion, and can thereby provide or activate knowledge of how an emotion feels.

Self-expression requires showing one's introspectible state. In addition to our account of making that state literally perceptible, or giving a

[4] See Sam Lubell, 'On the Therapist's Couch, a Jolt of Virtual Reality', *The New York Times*, 19 February 2004, section G, page 5, column 1.

demonstration of the presence of that state, we are now ready to understand a third form, namely self-expression as showing how one feels. As the locution 'showing how one feels' is used in English, I can show how I feel simply by grimacing, or by saying that I am annoyed. In some cases, however, I wish to enable others to know how it feels to be experiencing what I am; in such a case I want others to know how my melancholy, or exuberance, or anguish, or sense of loss feels. How might I do that? Here are some ways:

1. I might get you to experience whatever it is that put me into the affective state I am in, or at least something else sufficiently similar so that it is likely to produce similar effects on you. For instance, I send you the same cloying salesman who has raised my ire.
2. I might describe my feeling and ask you to imagine feeling that way. For instance I describe my debilitating melancholy in the hopes of getting you to imagine how I feel. To this end I might describe, as John Cheever's character does, how an object appears to me.
3. I might draw your attention to something external that in some way corresponds to the way I feel. For instance, I point out the weeping willow as corresponding to how I feel by looking the way I am inclined to behave, namely droopy and weepy. Or I point out the raging storm and remark, "That's how I feel."

Each of these procedures is at best a fallible means of getting you to understand how what I am experiencing feels. In cases of the first kind I might remain in doubt whether my own response to the salesman is much like yours. In cases of the second kind I might doubt whether my imagination has replicated your feeling. In cases of the third kind I might be unsure in just what way the raging storm is like your feeling. Further, just as there are familiar quandaries about whether I can know what your experience of yellow or taste of orange are like, so too we might wonder whether I can ever know what your experiences of melancholy, exuberance, or anger are like. In Section 7.2 we will, however, see interpersonal, as well as intrapersonal, limits on the possible forms that, say, feelings of melancholy, anger, or surprise can take. In light of these limits we then (Section 7.3) will be able to see that showing how one feels can enable others to know what your experience is like well enough

to provide them with what they characteristically seek from this form of self-expression, namely empathy.

We are also in a position to understand how one might convey knowledge of how a certain emotion, mood, or experience feels without its needing to be an emotion, mood, or experience being felt by anyone. Here, then, is one area in which expression conveys knowledge that goes beyond what is within a certain individual, and has the capacity instead to provide knowledge of a more universal kind. As we will see, showing how something feels is deeply bound up with artistic practice. This is the main topic of Sections 7.4 and 7.5.

7.2. Congruence of sensation and affect

Experience provides propositional and qualitative knowledge, and can be the catalyst for my knowledge of emotions. As the source of these latter two, experience provides me with knowledge how rather than knowledge that; it shows me how things look, sound, and so on, or how certain emotions feel. In addition, experiences themselves often have qualities enabling us to convey knowledge in indirect ways. To see how this is so, notice that many experiences are painful, pleasant, sour, bitter, sweet, or soothing. To someone with a certain physiology, a sound pattern will be soothing, a smell will be unpleasant. Again, to someone with a certain physiology, a chord will have a melancholy sound while a color might seem exuberant. (To creatures differently endowed, experience with these objects might not have anything like the same affective dimension, if any affective dimension at all.) Now, to say that an aroma is acrid to certain creatures is not to say that any such creature experiencing that aroma will enter into a sad or other negative emotion or mood. Pain is also inherently unpleasant, although of course to a masochist that displeasure might give rise to pleasure as well. The unpleasantness of pain might make a person experiencing it unhappy, but need not do so. So too an acrid smell such as the combination of sweat and rust in an old and heavily used bus is unpleasant even if it triggers appealingly bittersweet memories in me.

These points are germane to the well-documented phenomenon of cross-modal congruence, in which some sensations within one sensory modality seem to bear more of an affinity to some sensations within

another sensory modality than to others. Intuitively, we think that yellow is more like the sound of a piccolo than it is like the sound of an oboe; that the smell of sulfur is more like rough than it is like smooth; that the taste of lemon is more like the minor chord C–E flat–G than it is like the major chord C–E–G, and so forth.[5] Many such phenomena are borne out experimentally. To take two examples among many: subjects reliably match the louder of two tones with the brighter of two spots of white light, as well as matching higher-pitched tones with brighter lights (Marks, Hammeal, and Bornstein 1987).

More generally, our emotions and moods may be described along a number of dimensions, including the following three:

intense/mild
pleasant/unpleasant
dynamic/static.[6]

Anger is intense, slightly unpleasant, and highly dynamic. I take it that neither the intensity nor the unpleasantness of such an emotion is in need of elucidation. What does it mean to say that anger is dynamic? Recall that in Chapters 3 and 4, in the course of discussing the "affect program" conception of basic emotions, we suggested that emotions tend to have a life of their own; one in the grip of anger will be disposed to actions—raising her voice, kicking animals and furniture—that are liable to occur unless she makes an effort to prevent them. If she does not make such an effort but could do so, these acts are things she allows rather than does. (Observe, however, that in extreme cases she may be unable to prevent such actions.) Likewise, fear makes us flee unless we take steps to prevent flight (imagine being rushed by an angry dog that had given no warning bark); disgust makes us retch unless we curb the impulse to do so (imagine finding a large slug on your arm). These three emotions, then, are relatively dynamic. By contrast, sadness tends to produce the cessation of action and so is static, as well as being unpleasant and moderately intense.

[5] These intuitive judgments are borne out by a variety of experimental investigations surveyed in Marks 1978, and further developed in Marks 1987, 1995.

[6] These three dimensions are close to those proposed by Hartshorne 1934. They are not beyond dispute, and others have been proposed. For a survey of options see Marks 1978, chapter 3. Indeed, Marks 1995 refers to a "constellation of multidimensional relations connecting perception in different sense modalities", (p. 213). Our approach does not depend on the three dimensions mentioned in the text being precisely the correct ones.

Not only can emotions be characterized in these crude multi-dimensional terms; sensations can be so characterized as well. Leaving aside their representational characteristics (for instance an experience of an unpleasant object will itself often be unpleasant), sensations can often be characterized as intense/mild, pleasant/unpleasant, dynamic/static:

Vision. Some visual patterns, for example, seem to scintillate while others seem still; this is due to facts of the human visual system that are the proper topic of a psychology and physiology of perception. Scintillating patterns are dynamic. Again, yellow, orange, and red are more intense than blue and green, for instance, and yellow seems more dynamic than orange; both are more dynamic than either blue or green (Wilson 1966). It is not clear that non-representational aspects of visual experiences differ significantly from one another along the pleasant/unpleasant dimension.

Audition. Some chords, for instance the C major, feel at rest and thus static while others feel dynamic, and thus in need of resolution (Wicker 1968; Kivy 2002). Some sounds are screeching or eerie, and are unpleasant, while others are smooth or sweet, and are pleasant. Sounds are of course felt to vary in intensity with volume; but they are also felt to vary in intensity with pitch (Marks 1995).

Taste, smell, and touch. Clearly taste and smell sensations differ along the pleasant/unpleasant dimension—what some researchers refer to as "hedonic tone". Jeddi 1970, for instance, finds cross-cultural evidence that the sensation of warmth is more pleasant than is the sensation of cold. Taste and smell also differ along the intense/mild dimension. It is not clear that they differ in any significant degree along the dynamic/static dimension. Likewise for tactile sensations.

Our sensory modalities, then, enable us to make intermodal comparisons. Here is an empirical hypothesis to explain the basis of such judgments: Normal members of our species have epistemic, generally non-conscious, access to a three-dimensional coordinate system in which elements of a sensory modality can be mapped; the same goes for the qualitative components of such moods and emotions as have qualitative components. For each sensory modality, there will be a set of elements of that modality: The set of all visual experiences I have or have had,

the set of all olfactory experiences I have or have had, and so forth. For simplicity, let's just refer to each such set as a modality itself—so that the visual modality will be a set of visual experiences, and so forth. Members of each sensory modality, as well as each emotion or mood with a qualitative character, may now be mapped onto a point or set of points in the three-space determined by the dimensions given above. An experience with a distinctive degree of intensity/mildness, pleasantness/unpleasantness, and dynamism/stasis will be mapped onto one point in the three-space. By contrast, an experience that is, say, pleasant and dynamic, but neither intense nor mild, will be mapped onto a set of points rather than just one. Experiences with a distinctive character in only one dimension will be mapped onto a plane within our hypothesized three-space.

My hypothesis, then, is that in having experiences we also place those experiences onto distinctive points or spaces in the aforementioned three-space. I also propose that we are able to discern the proximity not only of two thus-placed experiences within the same modality, but also of two experiences from different modalities. Suppose that visual experience V has a degree of dynamism d, and that auditory experience A has that same degree of dynamism. If someone asks what my experience A is like, or how it feels, I can provide a partial answer by making visual experience V available to him—most likely by providing a visible object. If the questioner manages to have that visual experience, she may then come to know what A is like. This notion of "what it's like" is, however, notoriously vague. More precisely she will come to know how intense A is, and this is a substantial piece of knowledge about A. The same point applies to different modalities of assessment.

This account of what underlies our judgment of "congruences" or affinities among elements of different sense modalities, or elements of a sense modality to one or more emotion, does not imply that discerning such a similarity requires a conscious process of judgment and/or comparison. Instead, the process of discerning such similarities falls to the so-called adaptive unconscious, which was adumbrated in Section 4.3, and which has been at the center of interest in much recent experimental psychology. According to this research, the adaptive unconscious is responsible for a great deal of our "automatic" behavior, including such things as judgments

about a perceived object's distance from us and its relative location, syntactic and semantic processing, and many of our impressions about other people.[7] Employing the doctrine of the adaptive unconscious, we may say that sensitivity to intermodal congruence need be no more conscious than is our judgment of a perceived object's distance; or the process of interpreting a sentence newly encountered. Unlike the processes that result in our judgments about how far away an object is, and like semantic processing, our judgments of intermodal congruence may in certain cases be made conscious with sufficient acute introspection. Rather than just, say, intuiting an affinity between elements of two different modalities, we might in certain cases become introspectively aware of the basis of that affinity, for instance, in order to express ourselves. We may, however, find evidence for the awareness of intermodal congruences without yet knowing whether any such awareness can be the subject of introspection.

7.3 Showing what's within, part iii

Our sensitivity, be it conscious or unconscious, to intermodal congruences helps explain how we are able to convey information, if only of a limited kind, about aspects of our experience or affect. If you've never heard a piccolo, by telling you it is like yellow I give you some know-how, namely partial knowledge of how that instrument sounds, and thereby some ability, albeit limited, to recognize it by its sound. I might also enable you to imagine how it sounds, but, as before, this connection is not entirely reliable. In any case, these intermodal comparisons enable us to show some aspects of how our experiences feel to others who do not know how such experiences feel or in whom knowledge of how they feel is dormant.

[7] See Wilson 2002 for an overview of the cognitive unconscious as it figures into recent cognitive and social psychology. I differ from Wilson in one important respect. Wilson defines the cognitive unconscious as an area of mental processing inaccessible to conscious awareness. It is thus distinguished from the traditional notion of the "preconscious", an area of consciousness outside conscious awareness but accessible to it. Although the change does not drastically affect his theory, I would hold that many of the phenomena that he treats as inaccessible to consciousness are in fact accessible to it. Wilson later in this work in fact rescinds his overall policy for some emotions, and I would go a step farther and treat the cognitive unconscious as on the whole preconscious, with exceptions made for specific cases that are not open to introspection.

Not only are intermodal comparisons possible, elements from a given modality can be compared with emotions and moods. As we have seen, anger is intense, slightly unpleasant, and dynamic. Sadness is intense, unpleasant, and static, although sadness veering on anguish is intense, unpleasant, and dynamic. Disgust is intense, highly unpleasant, and dynamic but less dynamic than anger or anguish. These characterizations enable us to compare elements of one sensory modality with an emotion or mood. The major triad C–E–G is congruent, according to this system of measurement, with confidence or cheerfulness, for both are intense, pleasant, and relatively static. The color yellow is congruent with exuberance, for both are intense, pleasant, and dynamic.

We have, then, intermodal conguence, as well as congruence between elements of a given sensory modality and our emotions and moods. If congruence of the former sort exists, and we are aware of it when it does, then we can make sense of how I can show you, along one or more dimensions, what my experience is like by presenting sensory stimulation containing elements congruent to that experience. I thereby enable you to know certain aspects of how what I am experiencing feels. Similarly, if congruence of the latter sort exists, then we can make sense of how I can show you, again along one or more dimensions, what my emotion is like by presenting sensory stimulation containing elements congruent to that emotion. When I do that, I enable you to come to know aspects of how that emotion feels, rather than enabling you to perceive that emotion. Will these limits prevent my showing you enough of how I feel to make our combined efforts worthwhile? As we'll see in the next section, one standard of success is whether the audience is able to empathize with me enough to render aid, form an alliance, mate, or such like.

Return to our example from Chapter 2 in which Nathaniel Hawthorne describes Hester Prynne emerging from prison:

Those who had before known her, and had expected to behold her dimmed and obscured by a disastrous cloud, were astonished, and even startled, to perceive how her beauty shone out, and made a halo of the misfortune and ignominy in which she was enveloped. It may be true, that, to a sensitive observer, there was something exquisitely painful in it. Her attire, which, indeed, she had wrought for the occasion, in prison, and had modeled much after her own fancy, seemed to express the attitude of her spirit, the desperate recklessness of her mood, by its wild and picturesque peculiarity.

The "wild and picturesque peculiarity" of Hester's attire doesn't make her desperate recklessness perceptible—that recklessness doesn't seem to have visible characteristic components, nor does it appear to be perceptible in other ways. Furthermore, her attire might show, or help to show, that she is feeling desperately reckless, but it does more than this. It enables us to know how she feels because experience of that attire is congruent, in a way we now know how to articulate, with the experience of desperate recklessness. Hence the exquisite pain for the sensitive.

All these attempts to show others what our emotions or moods feel like might seem to run afoul of the, or at least one version of the, philosophical problem of other minds. Is not the "qualitative feel" of another's experience something to which I in principle cannot have access? Likewise even for my own experiences considered diachronically: could not things appear different to me now from the way they did yesterday without my being any the wiser?

Notice, first of all, that some kinds of inter- as well as intrapersonal inversions do not seem possible. It is difficult, for instance, to see how there could be an interpersonal inversion as between pain and pleasure. This would require that the experience that I feel upon cutting my hand with a knife is like the experience you feel upon stroking velvet. What could that mean? Unless your nervous system is detectably out of order, your cutting your hand must, like mine, produce an unpleasant experience. Whether your experiences resulting from bodily damage are exactly the same as mine is not at issue; the point rather is that both experiences must be unpleasant. Likewise, while I may be unsure whether the lemon looks to you just as it does to me, even when we are both in normal lighting conditions and our senses are in good working order, I will feel sure that however it looks to you, its color will look exuberant. So too, while aware of the possibility of an interpersonal inversion of sound qualities, I can nevertheless rule out the possibility that a minor chord sounds sad to me but happy to you. We can, that is, know something non-negligible about how one another's experiences feel, even if that knowledge still leaves some residual room for undetectable variation.

It might also be suggested that if the use of intermodal congruence could really enable others to know how my experience feels, then it would, *per impossibile*, solve what-it's-like-to-be-a-bat problems as well. Could an intelligent bat-like creature possessed of echolocation, or shark-like

creature possessed of electroreception, show me how its experience feels by finding experiences to which I have access that are congruent to theirs along the three dimensions discussed above? I suggest that they might very well do this, and if they did so they would give me some idea of what their experience is like. It is an empirical question whether any of the shark's experiences vary along the dimensions of pleasant/unpleasant, intense/mild, or dynamic/static. However, if any of them do, we can learn something of how the shark's electroreceptive experiences feel. I do not claim that the phenomenon of intermodal congruence answers all questions about how the world seems to a creature with a different sensory modality from any that we own. I do, however, suggest that doctrines holding that such experiences are "fundamentally alien" to us are overblown; their plausibility in the very least depends on whether these forms of experience can be characterized in such a way as to allow us to discern intermodal congruence.

We now have a third means of self-expression in addition to the two elucidated in earlier chapters, expression-as-making-perceptible and expression-as-demonstrating. Exploiting a perceived congruence between sensory quality S and emotion, experience, or mood E, I can present you with S with an intention of showing you how E feels. Unlike expression-as-making-perceptible and expression-as-demonstrating, this form of showing what is within puts you in a position to know how E feels—or more precisely how ϕ E feels, for one or more values of a ϕ that ranges across the three dimensions we've mooted.

Further, while it's clear that one can express both cognitive and affective states, we have left open since Chapter 2 whether one can express experiences such as a pain, a smell of vanilla, or the taste of lemon: While challenging the contention of some authors that doing so seems a conceptual impossibility, we suggested that expression of experience might require ingenuity of the sort we find among great artists. Now we can explain the sort of ingenuity required. If I can show you how my experience feels along one or more of the three dimensions under consideration here (intense/mild, pleasant/unpleasant, dynamic/static), that will give you knowledge of how ϕ that experience is, where ϕ ranges over one or more of those dimensions. I could show you something of how my taste of vanilla feels by playing a smooth, sweet chord on the piano. I could show you something of how yellow looks by

playing the piccolo, or to take Locke's case, of how scarlet looks by playing the trumpet. Intermodal congruence, then, enables us to show aspects of how our experiences feel, and thus enables us to express those experiences.

In earlier chapters we stressed how showing is a stronger relation than mere indication; the former, but not the latter, confers justification of a sort appropriate for knowledge and so is intimately bound up with knowledge. Showing-that makes knowledge-that available; showing-α makes perceptual knowledge available, and showing-how makes available knowledge of how an emotion or experience feels. The norms governing speech acts help to make the first kind of knowledge possible by serving as handicaps; what vouchsafes attempts to provide knowledge by showing how an emotion or experience feels? There are two questions here. First of all, we may ask how one shows (rather than just indicates) how one's own emotion or experience feels. Secondly, we may ask how one shows (rather than just indicates) how an emotion or experience feels whether or not it is one's own.

There may be no general answer to the first question; how justification is made available may depend on the case in question. For instance, a bit of behavior that shows how an emotion feels may depend for its credibility on an implicit assertion: My emotion feels like *this*—and then the agent demonstrates an object with phenomenal qualities she alleges to be congruent with her emotion. The assertoric, and thus handicap-involving backdrop of this act then accounts for such credibility as it has. By contrast, it is plausible that many of the automatic aspects of our expressive behavior show what they do by being indices of the qualitative characteristics of the emotions that cause them: I don't choose the register of my voice when I scream in pain, yet that register is surely congruent with an intensity that helps to characterize my pain.

How about showing an emotion or experience that is not mine, thereby creating a work that is expressive but not a self-expression? I suggest that in such a case the artist shows (rather than merely indicates) how that emotion or experience feels only when she has achieved a credibility within her community: she has a reputation for showing how emotions and other experiences really feel—as borne out by frequent experience with her artworks in which we find them correct to the emotion or experience in question. This may help account for the importance we

attach to authenticity among artists in spite of not demanding that they express emotions or experiences of which they are currently possessed.

An artist's credibility also depends on her ability consistently to put us in a position to empathize with others. However, let me repeat a caveat before we consider the role of empathy in expressiveness and self-expression. I have postulated the three dimensions of intense/mild, pleasant/unpleasant, and dynamic/static as the basis of intermodal congruence, as well as the basis of congruence between sensations and affect. That particular hypothesis may turn out incorrect while the more essential features of the present approach stand. Intermodal and sensory-affective congruences may depend upon other dimensions than those I have hypothesized: perhaps there are other dimensions beyond these, and a better theory might not even include all these three. The robustness of the phenomena of intermodal and sensory-affective congruence strongly suggests, however, that some such dimension or dimensions must exist to make these congruences possible.

7.4. Empathy

What is the value of enabling you to know how my emotion or experience feels, and is that value, if such there be, relevant to self-expression? After all, in light of what we've learned in earlier chapters, I could show you my anger by making it perceptible, or instead by demonstrating its presence with compelling evidence. Why would one need a third way beyond these two? My answer, in broadest outline, is that one of the signal virtues of showing how my emotion or experience feels is that doing so puts others in a position to empathize with me. We empathize with others when we imagine how they feel, but where the imagination in question must with reasonable accuracy capture that feeling. Thus, while imagination is not essentially constrained to accuracy (I can imagine winged horses and golden mountains), my imagination "puts me in your shoes" only if what I imagine is, or is relevantly congruent with, what you're feeling. Once in your shoes I will then be more likely to come to your aid, assuage your pain, become an ally, and so forth.

The imagination required in empathy is thus constrained by a requirement of "direction of fit": it must track how things are with you if it's to count as empathizing with, say, your shame rather than your regret.

It is also constrained by the requirement that I imagine *myself* feeling the feeling that I am ascribing to you; it is not enough that I imagine your, or for that matter someone's, feeling what I am ascribing to you. Call these the *fidelity* and *de se* requirements, respectively. These two requirements help explain why it can be so challenging to empathize with those from radically different cultures or with views deeply opposed to our own. For instance, I personally would have trouble empathizing with Aztec priests, or with someone who bombs an abortion clinic. I have difficulty imagining myself feeling compelled to remove a beating heart from a live person, or feeling the necessity of killing anyone involved in abortions. Even if I learn what these people feel, I have trouble imagining myself feeling like that.

The difficulty of meeting the fidelity and *de se* requirements for empathy also helps to explain why it is a considerable achievement when an author, screenwriter, documentarist, or photographer makes such empathy possible. For example, in the famous anti-war documentary, *Hearts and Minds*, we cut from a shot of General Westmoreland telling us that Asians don't have the same concern for the sanctity of an individual's life as is common in the West, to a shot of a Vietnamese mother weeping uncontrollably at the grave of what is presumably her lost son. Our empathy with her grief requires our imagining ourselves losing a child to war, and thereby gives us a glimpse of her suffering. In so doing, we see the absurdity of Westmoreland's pronouncement.

Again, a novelist might enable me to imagine being ostracized within a small rural community. Jane Hamilton does this in her *A Map of the World*. In its skillful depictions of various conversations, tones of voice, facial expressions, and so on of characters, Hamilton shows us what a sense of social isolation feels like. She does this by enabling me to imagine being in that situation, and thereby enables me to know how I would feel if I were in that situation. Even if I have never felt ostracized, the excellence of the novel consists at least in part in its ability to show me how that would feel.[8]

By showing you how an emotion, mood, or experience of mine feels, I might, if you are appropriately attentive, equip you with two distinct skills: first, the skill of being able to recognize that emotion, mood, or

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[8] I elaborate on these points in Green forthcoming b.

experience by how it feels; secondly, the ability to imagine how that emotion, mood, or experience feels. Because of the latter, by showing you how an emotion, and so on, feels, I might enable you to imagine yourself feeling what I am feeling. In doing so you can fulfill the faithfulness and *de se* requirements. For this reason, by showing you how an emotion, mood, or experience of mine feels I might enable you to empathize with me. The facilitating of empathy is, then, one of the things to which expression-as-showing-how-it-feels is suited, and distinguishes it from both expression-as-perception-enabling and expression-as-demonstrating.

I said that showing how an emotion, mood or experience feels might enable you to empathize with me. You might try but fail to do so, for reasons I'll return to in a moment. By contrast, many writers hold, for A to empathize with B, or more precisely for A to empathize with B's φ, where φ is an emotion, experience, or perhaps even a thought, A must feel φ and on that basis imagine being in B's shoes.[9] On this view, to empathize with your terror I must feel terror myself, and to empathize with your resentment of God I must resent God too. Of course this is not a sufficient condition; I don't empathize with your aching just-stubbed toe by stubbing mine. In addition to sharing your emotion (or experience), on this account I must use my own replication of your situation to imagine my way into what you are feeling.

Not only is this view intuitively implausible, writers seem to be driven to it by impoverished conceptions of the imagination and of emotion. It is of course *not* enough for me to empathize with your feeling of being ostracized that I have been ostracized in the past. Nor is it enough that I have been ostracized in the past and I am capable of calling up that memory into consciousness. One is not empathetic simply by virtue of having dormant skills. Instead I have to do something that makes me count as feeling with you. But it is a mistake to infer that this feeling with others requires actually duplicating their feelings in myself. After all, to get myself to feel ostracized I'd have to induce certain beliefs in myself, such as that I am being excluded from a group on the basis of inappropriate considerations. (I am certainly not endorsing the view that emotions are a

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[9] See for instance Gaut 1999 and Plantinga 1999. Frith 1989 also takes empathy to require an actual sharing of emotions, writing, "Empathy presupposes, amongst other things, a recognition of different mental states. It also presupposes that one goes beyond the recognition of difference to adopt the other person's frame of mind with all the consequences of emotional reactions." (p. 144–5)

species of judgment; I am assuming something much weaker, namely that certain emotions require judgments or beliefs as necessary conditions.) But suppose I don't feel that way at this point; as it happens, I feel more or less accepted by the groups I care about. Writers like Berys Gaut (1999), Alex Neill (1996), and Ute Frith (1989) would infer that I am incapable of empathizing with your sense of ostracism, but surely that is untrue. It would be awfully nice of me to follow a Pascal-style routine to get myself to believe that I am being excluded, but by the time I carry this off it will probably be too late for my empathy to be worth anything to you. Instead, I could save a lot of time and effort simply by calling up into conscious awareness my *memory* of how I felt when I was ostracized in the past. On the basis of that conscious awareness, I now know how you feel, not dispositionally but occurrently. If I now go on to use this conscious awareness as a prop in which I imagine that you are feeling *this*, then I have empathized with you.

Gaut didn't claim that for me to empathize with your anguish it is sufficient that I feel anguish. He takes this as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. Following Neill 1996, Gaut also holds that, "empathy requires one imaginatively to enter into a character's mind and feel with him because of one's imagining of his situation" (1999, p. 206). So on this view, to empathize with another's feeling of φ, I not only have to feel φ, I must also use that feeling of φ as a kind of prop on the basis of which to imagine being in your situation. This further condition of imaginative identification seems eminently plausible. What it does not do is mandate any requirement that I actually feel what I imagine you to be feeling. Rather, it is enough that I be able to call into consciousness my experience of that feeling without actually reliving it, and then on that basis imagine my way into your situation. That seems to be enough to enable me to feel with you. For emotions and moods having a qualitative dimension, we now see that it is also enough to learn how they feel by finding their location in the three-dimensional space we suggested in the last section.

This in turn, however, raises the question why this elicitation of empathy should be of value. Some people are less empathetic than others; in certain forms of autism the capacity for empathy is considerably impaired. However, when I do elicit another's empathy, that is one large step in winning their aid. One who empathizes with my pain, fear, or sadness stands

a good chance of providing protection, of helping to nurse wounds, or of offering encouragement.[10] These claims hold at best for the most part and admit of many exceptions. However, it does seem in general that one who empathizes with my pain (fear, sadness) is more likely to come to my aid than if she were merely aware, by means of either perception or demonstration, of that pain (fear, sadness). This aid-eliciting dimension of expression-as-showing-how-it-feels is one important feature distinguishing it from expression-as-making-perceptible, as well as expression-as-demonstrating. Neither of these two latter phenomena is particularly associated with the elicitation of succor; expression-as-showing-how-it-feels is made to order, and is one reason why showing-as-ability-enabling plays a distinctive role in self-expression.

Attempts by self-expression to facilitate empathy will not be equally effective for all people. As we have mentioned before, one characteristic of certain forms of autism is the presence of high-level cognitive capacities combined with the absence of an ability to empathize with others. For this reason an autistic person might be left cold by watching a mother grieving over her dead child, while many others will be moved powerfully. Further, common empathic responses might be invoked for the sake of manipulation, as is common in advertising. In addition, an artist might invoke such responses in order to undermine some of our own beliefs about ourselves. For instance in Leon Golub's *Interrogation* series we often meet the smiling eyes of one of the "interrogators", while the victim's face is covered by a mask or a hand. As a result a first reaction is to empathize with the situation of the interrogator, perhaps to feel the challenge of extracting information from a diffident suspect, and maybe even the pleasure of having another person completely under our own power. We might do this half-consciously, before realizing that we would do better to consider the plight of the man bound in the chair. As we reflect on this sequence of reactions, we may feel disturbed at having identified with a perpetrator before identifying with his victim, and even further disturbed about having to realize that this reaction was both immediate and not fully conscious. Does each of us harbor a torturer within?

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[10] Williams 2003 stresses these points in her evolutionary account of the facial expression of pain. Green 2003a offers a refinement of her account of the communicative role of such facial expressions.

7.5. Artistic expression

A central question for philosophical aesthetics asks what it might mean for an inanimate object such as a piece of music, a sculpture, a painting, or a poem to be sad or have some other affective property such as exuberance, anguish, edginess, or serenity. In fact this question arises not just for works of art or, for that matter, just for artifacts. We might also wonder how the wind can have a melancholy sound, or how the flowering tree manages to look exuberant. In addition, many things other than emotions can be expressed, so we do well to consider how it is that a bonsai might have a pensive look, or how a building might have a menacing demeanor.

The problem, then, posed at the right level of generality, is how a non-sentient object can have an affective or other expressible property. Many philosophers concerned with this problem point out that non-sentient objects are not capable of feeling such emotions as sadness, anger, or fear, and conclude that a puzzle arises from the fact that we ascribe qualities like sadness and anger to these non-sentient objects. From what we have learned in foregoing chapters, an emotion such as sadness, anger, or fear is a complex phenomenon only a component of which is its qualitative dimension. For all we have established thus far, then, anger might be an emotion with, say, four possible criteria (a qualitative feeling of anger, impulses to aggressive behavior including facial expressions, a judgment of a certain sort, and physiological changes such as increased blood flow to the arms) any three of which are sufficient for its attribution. In that case one could be angry without feeling angry, whence the fact that an inanimate object is insensate does not yet show that it cannot be angry.

Of course, many inanimate objects to which we ascribe emotional qualities also lack a physiology and dispositions to behavior as well. For this reason they would seem to meet either none, or too few, of the other criteria needed for ascription of affective states. On what basis, then, can we be ascribing such qualities as melancholy to the seascape, the yew tree, or the sonata? It might be suggested that we simply do talk this way, and that this way of talking, being one of the language-games we play, is not in need of any grounding. In response, we may agree that we do indeed talk this way but remark also that we should not accept without argument that it is *simply* the case that we do so. Perhaps we do so for a reason.

Moreover, while the fact that we talk this way may not be *in need* of any grounding, it might be illuminating to investigate why we talk the way we do. Otherwise it will be an open possibility that the attribution of sadness both to the weeping child and to the sonata is a play on words, just as it is a play on words to remark that I have two trunks in the driveway, one in my car and the other possessed by my pet elephant.

I don't assume, then, that the very intelligibility of ascriptions of affective qualities to inanimate objects has to be vouchsafed by a philosophical explanation. What I'll suppose is much weaker, namely that we *may* shed light on such ascriptions by investigating their basis. In this section I'll consider only the way in which expressiveness may be found in objects that are not representational, as well as in objects whose representational character has nothing to do with their expressiveness. (In the next section, 7.6, we will consider how expressiveness can be achieved through representation.) Note also that while philosophical aesthetics is concerned almost exclusively with emotional expressiveness, our discussion thus far suggests that this restriction is not mandatory. It is no less important to understand what it might mean for an inanimate object to express doubt, certainty, or indifference; likewise for items of perceptual experience.

One more methodological remark: it may be that expressiveness takes quite different forms and admits of quite different explanations in the various arts. However, I shall assume that all else being equal, the more we can explain the varieties of expressiveness in terms of a single principle or set of principles, the more powerful that explanation will be. The majority of theories of expressiveness in non-representational arts are primarily concerned with music. Nevertheless, an explanation that purports only to account, say, for how musical expressiveness works is liable to be trumped by another account that does at least as well as it does for music but that also applies to other art forms.

What, then, is it that makes a (non-programmatic) piece of music melancholy; in virtue of what is a color or pattern of colors and/or shapes exuberant? More generally, *in virtue of what does a non-sentient object A possess affective or experiential quality E*? Answers to this question fall into two categories, namely cognitive and non-cognitive theories.

Cognitive theories. According to theories of this kind, an object possesses an affective or experiential quality E just in case E can properly be discerned or

imagined to inhere in A by appropriately placed viewers (listeners, etc.) of A. That discernment or imagination might be due to the perceived resemblance of E to some other object (such as a sentient agent expressing her emotion) (Kivy 2002; Davies 1994), to an ascription of a state of mind to the imagined utterer of the work or some of its parts that best accounts for its distinctive features (Vermazen 1986), to being a best hypothesis on the part of an ideal listener as to what state of mind the composer of the music intended such a listener to hear in the passage (Stecker 2001), to being an ascription of a state of mind to the imaginary protagonist of the passage that figures in the best interpretation of the work taken as a whole (Robinson 1998), or to being an ascription of properties to an imagined persona or personae in the work (Levinson 1990, 1996, 2002, 2006; Maus 1997).

Non-Cognitive theories. According to theories of this kind, an object A possesses affective or experiential quality E just in case A is appropriately related to an emotional or other non-cognitive experience of E on the part of appropriately placed viewers (listeners, etc.). The relation in question might be a matter of causation as between the artifact and some affective state of the viewer (the arousal theory), causation as between an affective state of the creator of the artifact and the artifact, causation as between the creator's affect and those of the viewer (Tolstoy 1989), or of a dispositional relation between work and viewer (Matravers 1998, 2003). These non-cognitive theories do not require a belief, judgment, or imagining on the part of the viewer that the artifact in question possesses any affective quality.

The approach that falls naturally out of our investigations in this and previous chapters is what we might call the Expressiveness as Showing Theory. With apologies to the New Age semi-cult popular in the seventies, let us abbreviate this to 'EST'. We've said that all expression is a matter of showing what is within, and that this phenomenon in turn can take one of three forms—making perceptible, demonstrating, and showing how something feels. These aspects of showing naturally suggest an account not only of expressiveness as showing one's feeling (thought, experience, etc.), but also of expressiveness as showing *a* feeling (thought, experience, etc.) that need not be being felt. A painting might present, and thereby show, rage without it being a rage actually felt by anyone. If the work is successful we might nevertheless say that it captures rage powerfully. Perhaps it does this by depicting an enraged face. In this case it shows what rage looks like

without enabling us to perceive anyone's rage, just as a painting of a tree in my yard enables us to know how that tree looks (at least if it is at all realistic) without enabling us to perceive that tree.

On the other hand the painting might show rage by containing brush strokes looking as if they were made in the grip of rage. It is natural to imagine that these lines were made by an angry person. That is not mandatory, however; we could just as well see them as characteristic symptoms of anger and understand their angry character on these grounds, just as we could see a characteristic symptom of jaundice in a baby's yellow cornea. Angry marks on the wall look as if they were made in anger. We call the hurricane angry because it behaves as if it were someone, albeit a very large and powerful someone, in a rage. The marks and hurricane are angry, and show how anger behaves, without being tied to any particular sensory modality. Angry behavior need not have a characteristic color or sound, but rather can be characterized in such terms as that it tends to cause damage. (An object might also enable us to perceive a particular case of anger, perhaps as a result of being a photo of an angry woman. However, this would not be what makes the object expressive of anger; rather, it is the fact that it shows us how anger looks.)

Thirdly, the painting might show the anger by enabling us to know how anger feels. Perhaps it provides visual experiences congruent to anger in the sense of the foregoing sections of this chapter; or perhaps it depicts a situation which is palpably such that were we in it, we would feel anger. (We discuss this phenomenon of expression via representation in Section 7.6 below.)

The EST, then, is a cognitive theory. According to it, if a non-sentient object is angry on account of showing what anger looks like (a sculpture of an enraged man, for instance, or a livid mask) then it shows anger by enabling us to gain knowledge of how anger *looks*—likewise for other sensory modalities. If the object displays a characteristic component of anger, then it enables us to gain knowledge by showing how anger behaves. Finally, if the object shows us how anger feels, then it enables us to gain knowledge of how that emotion feels.

Crystallizing the EST, then, we may say that an *object O possesses affective or experiential quality E just in case O is a potential source of knowledge of E—either by showing how E characteristically appears, how E characteristically behaves, or how E characteristically feels.* While the EST emphasizes the ability

of an expressive object to convey knowledge, it should also be clear that the knowledge in question is at least as much a matter of knowledge how as it is a matter of knowledge that. Again, the ability of an artifact to show someone how, for instance, an emotion feels, is compatible with that person's already knowing how it feels. Further, an object might possess an affective quality, such as sadness, even though it is misleading to describe it as sad. Hence a sonata might have a sad movement, and as a result possesses sadness according to the EST account. It might still be misleading to describe the sonata as sad if it exemplifies many other emotions as well. For this reason it will be clearer to describe an object as possessing affective quality E rather than just describing it as being E.

To elucidate further what is distinctive of the EST, I'll discuss some well-known alternatives and explain why it differs from them in such a way as to be superior to them. I'll argue that the expressiveness-as-showing theory improves upon these alternatives by incorporating their insights while going beyond them, either by being more general, or by eschewing features of these theories that are not necessary. It will not be to our purpose to discuss all theories falling under either the cognitive or non-cognitive rubric. Instead I'll focus just on those that seem to me the most plausible, and discuss them to the extent that doing so enables me to bring into full relief the view I offer here.

7.5.1. Resemblance theories

As the name suggests, this view explains the affective character of an artifact like a piece of music in terms of its resemblance to human expression. The sagging and cascading sounds of a sonata resemble the behavior of a person in the throes of anguish as she weeps, moves slowly, and then throws herself to the ground. The searing guitar riff resembles a raging scream. Other music will jump, spring, and bounce just as a joyous person might do. And so on. Before considering specific versions of this theory, however, we should attend to Jerrold Levinson's (2006) argument that all theories in this category are inadequate. He offers an objection to all views of musical expression (and perhaps artistic expression generally) that depend upon a perceived resemblance between the work and an agent who is literally expressing her emotion. Levinson holds that seeing or otherwise perceiving a resemblance between A and B is never on its own a sufficient condition for seeing (hearing, etc.) A *as* B. He gives the example

of seeing the resemblance of a leafy tree and a bushy head. In seeing such a resemblance, Levinson contends, we do not *thereby* see the tree as a bushy head. Perceiving a resemblance is thus not a sufficient condition for seeing-as.

Levinson is right to point out that perceiving a resemblance is not a sufficient condition for seeing- (or otherwise perceiving-) as. The point does not, however, undermine resemblance-based views of musical (or other forms of non-sentient) expression, for it is not clear that in order to perceive the expressiveness of an object one must see it as anything other than what it is. I see the Newfoundland's face, and I see the sadness in that face, for I perceive that the face has a sad look. In order to do this, must I also see it *as* sad? That evidently depends upon how we construe the truth conditions of this locution. Does seeing α as Φ require that I imagine α to be Φ, or to be the vehicle of some agent's expression of Φ? In that case the seeing-as requirement is too strong: Surely I can perceive the sad look in the Newfoundland's face, or the contemptuous look in the face of a man whose face has been disfigured by an accident, without imagining anything at all? On the other hand if the seeing-as condition does not require use of the imagination, then for all Levinson has said, perception of a resemblance will be enough to satisfy it.

Levinson's objection to resemblance-based views does not, it seems, hit its target. Let us now consider two versions of that theory to see how they account for the relevant phenomena.

The Contour/Convention Theory. Formulating what is perhaps the best known theory of musical expressiveness, Kivy's "contour theory", holds that "[music's] sonic 'shape', bears a structural analogy to the heard and seen manifestations of human emotional expression" (2002, p. 40). In listening to such music we sense its emotional characteristics by virtue of discerning this analogy. Other music, according to Kivy, has the expressive character it does as a result of conventions. The theme to *2001: A Space Odyssey* expresses ambition, and if the contour part of the theory does not account for this fact, on Kivy's view the convention part of that theory will take up the slack.

Kivy believes the discernment of resemblance between the structural features of the music and the structural features of human emotional expression is not a conscious process. For this reason he can account for

the fact that our discernment of the expressiveness of an object can be instantaneous rather than the result of a conscious calculation. In addition, Kivy is aware of the fact that a piece of music can bear a structural analogy to many other things besides expressive behavior (exploding geysers, cascading waterfalls, stampeding bison) and while on occasion program music might represent such things, music does not express them. Kivy proposes an evolutionary hypothesis to the effect that human beings are simply prone to see analogies with expressive behavior in favor of the many other analogies that they might discern, just as we are prone to see a face in an electrical plug in a wall instead of the many other things that we could see there.

According to this "contour and convention theory", then, music might have a sad sound by virtue of containing structural features isomorphic to the heard or seen structural features of a person's behavior when she is displaying her sadness. However, the sadness of a bit of music might be due either to structural features of the music, such as the development of a melody over a few measures, or because of the peculiarly melancholy sound of a chord. Kivy's "contour and convention" theory has an account to offer of the former sorts of case, but not of the latter. He is clear about this, writing,

we have yet to work one further element into the contour theory: that is the expressive chords, major, minor and diminished. These chords are generally perceived as cheerful, melancholy, and anguished, respectively ... The problem is that these individual chords, not having a contour, being experienced as simple qualities, do not seem to bear any analogy at all to human behavior—hence must be expressive of cheerfulness, melancholy and anguish in some other way than that allowed by the contour theory of musical expressiveness. (2002, p. 43)

Kivy goes on to observe that there is no generally accepted explanation for the expressive features of these chords, and so the contour theory is no worse off than any other theory in this regard. Kivy infers that the fact that the contour theory cannot provide an explanation here is, as he says, "no great deficit". This is of course a fallacy. If no theory in a class C can account for a datum that is in the domain of C-type theories, it is equally possible that all theories in that class are incorrect, not that any one of them is off the hook. Leaving this aside, however, Kivy does try his hand at an explanation of the expressive qualities of chords along the following lines. He observes that the major triad C–E–G sounds stable; for instance

a movement could easily end on it. However, it would not sound at all natural to end a movement on the diminished triad C–E flat–G flat. The same is true, if to a lesser extent, of the minor triad C–E flat–G. Kivy suggests that this may be why the major triad sounds cheerful, the minor triad melancholy, and the diminished triad anguished.

These remarks are suggestive but cannot stand on their own as a solution to the problem that Kivy has raised for himself. Kivy does not tell us why cheerfulness, melancholy, and anguish should be considered in increasing order of instability. Nor is it clear why, if that were established, it would fall under the "contour" theory: In what way is instability an aspect of the contour of anguish, and is that way anything like the way in which sad behavior tends to have a drooping character that can be mapped onto a temporal progression of sounds?

While the contour/convention theory appears unable to account for the expressive qualities of such things as chords, the EST is suited to do so. The reason is that the chords C–E–G, C–E flat–G flat, and C–E flat–G each map onto a different location within the three-space we have hypothesized earlier in this chapter; each of those three locations corresponds to different emotions, and it is thus those emotions with which each of these three chords is congruent. The EST now tells us that the three chords have the expressive qualities they do by virtue of showing how each of those emotions feel.

In addition to covering more musical cases than the contour/convention theory, the EST also is applicable to areas outside music. The aforementioned angry painting, whose anger is due to its enabling us to know how that emotion feels, does not resemble, or contain components that resemble, human expressions of anger. No one depicted in the painting is angry; they are all either smugly satisfied, or are too busy fighting for survival. Or imagine a photograph that depicts a happy scene, a puppy lazing in the grass under a tree. That photograph is a non-sentient object with an affective quality. It does not resemble a characteristic expression of happiness. Again, Rodchenko's photograph, *Pioneer Girl* (Figure 7.1), is admiring not because it bears a perceptual resemblance to literal expressions of admiration, but because it enables us to know how admiration feels.

A clarification is in order. We have not disagreed with Kivy's explanation of the cases that his theory seems to handle well. We have not

Figure 7.1: Rodchenko's *Pioneer Girl* Art © Estate of Alexander Rodchenko/RAO, Moscow/VAGA, New York

challenged the claim that some sad music bears a structural analogy to the look or sound of sad human behavior, likewise for angry music, and so on. Does this mean that the EST contains a resemblance component while adding other components as well? No it does not. While the EST does not

contradict the claim that some expressive music bears a structural analogy to expressive human behavior, it does not take this as an *explanation* of the expressiveness of such music. Rather, what accounts for the expressiveness of such music is the fact that it shows how sadness sounds, looks, feels, or otherwise manifests itself. Just as a painting's resemblance to the sitter is of interest to the extent that it shows what the sitter looked like, so too the music's resemblance to manifestations of emotion is of interest to the extent that it shows us one or more dimension of those emotions.

The Emotion-Characteristics-In-Sound Theory Steven Davies writes,

the expressiveness of music consists in its presenting emotion characteristics in its appearance ... These expressive appearances ... are not occurrent emotions at all. They are emergent properties of the things to which they are attributed. (Davies 1994, p. 228)

Elaborating on this, Davies explains that such expressiveness "depends mainly on a resemblance we perceive between the dynamic character of music and human movement, gait, bearing, or carriage" (Davies 1994, p. 229). Thus on this view, emotions "are heard in music as belonging to it, just as appearances of emotion are present in the bearing, gait, or deportment of our fellow humans and other creatures" (Davies 1994, p. 239).

In a careful discussion of Davies's position, Levinson suggests a gloss of that view as follows: P is expressive of E iff P exhibits an emotion-characteristic-in-sound associated with E, that is, exhibits a sound-appearance analogous to the human emotion-characteristic-in-appearance of E (Levinson 2006). Levinson now puts pressure on Davies's theory at the following point. Everything is analogous to everything else in some respect or other. But then, how analogous does a sound appearance have to be to an emotion-characteristic-in-appearance to be relevantly associated with it, that is, to be expressive of it? Levinson contends that the only possible answer to this question is that we happen to "animate" some aural patterns in a certain way. Levinson writes,

I think it is plain that there is no answer to this except by appeal to our disposition to *hear* that emotion—rather than another, or none at all—in the music, that is, by appeal to our disposition to aurally construe the music as an instance of personal expression, perceiving the human appearances in the

musical ones, in effect animating the sounds in a certain manner...Only if this occurs does the music have the expressiveness in question, regardless of the degree of similarity between the music's appearances and the human appearances by relation to which it ends up being expressive, or alternatively, the degree of similarity between the experiences of those appearances. (Levinson 2006)

Levinson in effect argues that the only plausible elaboration of Davies's theory that answers the question, How much similarity is required to make for expressiveness? must go the way of Levinson's own position, the persona theory, to be discussed below. Davies, however, could reply with help from Kivy's hypothesis, that we tend to find some similarities more salient than others, perhaps for reasons having to do with our species' evolutionary history. In so doing, however, Davies need not suppose that those similarities that we do discern are due to seeing the music as an instance of personal expression. While it may be that by thus taking a page from Kivy, Davies will make his own theory less distinguishable from Kivy's, he will not need to postulate personae in the understanding of expressive music.

As was our attitude toward Kivy, it is no aim of the present discussion to refute Davies's own view. In fact, we might well be suspicious of an attempt to do so since as observed by Stecker 1999, it is not luminously clear just what an emotion-characteristic-in-sound actually is. Rather, if we understand Davies's own view at least enough to find it prima facie plausible, we do well to try to elucidate it, and the EST does just that. Consider an example of an emotion-characteristic-in-sound, melancholy-in-sound, or more colloquially, a melancholy sound. The EST allows us to see what that might be, that is, it allows us to see what makes some sounds melancholy, by explaining that they are like melancholy along the dimensions of intensity, pleasantness, and dynamism. What makes other sounds happy is that they are like happiness along these same three dimensions, and so forth.

The gist of the EST is that it specifies the main dimensions along which we seek resemblance between properties of non-sentient objects and sentient objects. Not just any resemblance will do; we seek affinities along particular lines. Further, because of the particular lines of affinity that the EST postulates, we can understand what an emotion-characteristic-in-sound is. An aural phenomenon P is an emotion-characteristic-in-sound

E, where E is some affective property, just in case P and emotion E are equally intense or non-intense, equally pleasant or unpleasant, and equally dynamic or static.

Finally, many of our comments about Kivy's position carry over to that of Davies. In particular, we have shown that the EST position applies to musical phenomena, particularly synchronic dimensions of music, that Kivy's position does not handle. The same goes for Davies's position. Finally, we have argued that the EST applies to cases other than music that are not touched by Kivy's theory, and the same goes for Davies's theory.

7.5.2. *The Persona Theory*

Another cognitivist theory we might call the *Persona Theory*. According to this view, what makes an object A have affective quality E is that when we experience it we are apt to, or are disposed to, or are invited to, imagine A to contain one or more agents expressing their E. Thus for instance what makes the symphony anguished is that when we hear it we are apt to, or are disposed to, or are invited to imagine that we hear one or more agents expressing their anguish. (We will come back in a moment to dwell on these differences of formulation.)

The most developed defense of this position is in the work of Jerry Levinson, and I shall focus on his formulation. Levinson argues first of all, as background for his position, that hearing expressiveness in music commits us to hearing it as, or to being disposed to hear it as, an expression of emotion by what he calls a "persona".

we should not consider a piece of music to be strictly *expressive* of an emotion—rather than standing in some *other*, weaker, relation to it, such as possessing a perceptual quality associated with the emotion—unless we regard it as analogous to a being endowed with sentiments capable of announcing themselves in an external manner. In short, music expresses an emotion only to the extent that we are disposed to hear it as the expression of an emotion, albeit in a non-standard manner, by a person or person-like entity.

The premise seems to be that in hearing a piece of music as expressive of an emotion we are committed to hearing that music as analogous to, that is, as similar to, a being capable of both experiencing and expressing her emotions. The conclusion that Levinson draws from this premise is that in

hearing a piece of music as expressive of an emotion we are committed to hearing it as the expression of an emotion by a person or person-like entity.

This conclusion does not follow in the absence of further assumptions concerning what would count as being relevantly analogous. The music can be analogous to a being endowed with sentiments capable of announcing themselves in an external manner, without itself being a person or person-like entity. It can be analogous to such a being by, for instance, sounding sad. Levinson does not establish that the imputation of an expressive property to music requires postulation of a persona in that music.

In spite of this shortcoming, let us turn to Levinson's theory. Here is Levinson's formulation:

a passage of music P is expressive of an emotion E if and only if P, in context, is readily heard, by a listener experienced in the genre in question, as an expression of E. Since expressing requires an expresser, this means that in so hearing the music the listener is in effect committed to hearing an agent in the music—what we can call the music's *persona*—or to at least imagining such an agent in a backgrounded manner. But this agent or persona, it must be stressed, is almost entirely indefinite, a sort of minimal person, characterized only by the emotion we hear it to be expressing and the musical gesture through which it does so.

We can agree with important components of Levinson's account of expressiveness in music while leaving others aside. First of all, the first sentence of the passage is true. However, as we have just seen, Levinson does not succeed in establishing the truth of the second sentence of this passage. For this reason we may agree with the first sentence without being committed to the view that proper appreciation of expressive music requires postulation of a persona in the music.

Although Levinson's argument for the requirement of the postulation of personae in music fails, might the conclusion of that argument nevertheless be plausible? Intuitively, it does not seem to me plausible that the postulation of personae in music is mandatory. Further, Levinson gives no reason why the postulation of personae is specifically justified in the understanding of music rather than in other artforms, or for that matter, other objects, artifacts or not, that have expressive properties. Without such a reason, the plausibility of a mandatory personae doctrine in application to things other than music is germane to the assessment of his own position. For instance, a Neopolitan Mastiff has an undeniably sad face. Surely we can discern this

without imagining a persona (canine or otherwise) expressing its sadness in or through the dog's face? So too the forest has a gloomy look to it, but I do not see the plausibility in claiming that in discerning this we are thereby committed to seeing the forest as being a persona, or as comprising personae, expressing their sadness. If such claims would not be plausible in these cases, why should they be more plausible in the instance of music?

This is not to say that the postulation of a persona in expressive music is improper. Rather, if music is readily heard as a manifestation of emotion E, a listener is *entitled*, but not *committed*, to imagine hearing an agent expressing E. She is not appreciating the music incorrectly if she imagines such an agent, but nor is she mandated so to hear the music. Similarly, there is nothing incorrect about imagining an elephant-shaped cloud to be an elephant. After all, such imagining does not have mind-to-world direction of fit, and does not commit the person doing the imagining to the claim that the cloud is an elephant or is even particularly like an elephant. So too, however, if she refrains from so imagining the cloud, she is not failing to grasp a fact about the cloud, and she is not failing to react to the cloud in a way that is obligatory. Likewise, I submit that in responding to expressive music without imagining a persona, we are not failing to grasp a fact about the music, nor failing to react to the music in a way that is obligatory.

Taking these points into account, we might reformulate Levinson's position as follows:

a passage of music P is expressive of an emotion E if and only if P, in context, is readily heard, by a listener experienced in the genre in question, as an expression of E. In so hearing the music the listener is entitled, but not obliged, to imagine hearing an agent in the music—what we can call the music's *persona*—expressing her E.

I see nothing objectionable in this modified account. However, it does not offer an explanation of *why* some passages in music are readily heard as an expression of an emotion whereas some others are not. The EST, by virtue of its elucidation of the various forms that showing can take, offers such an account. With respect to Levinson's persona theory, then, we may agree with some of its components, disagree with others, while, furthermore, offering a theory that explains why such of its components as are correct, are indeed so.

7.5.3. *The music-sounds-the-way-emotions-feel doctrine*

Carroll Pratt is famous for espousing the doctrine of a kind of iconic resemblance as between the sound of music, or at least expressive music, and the feel of emotions. His position begins with a denial that music's expressiveness is due to its arousing, or its being disposed to arouse, emotions in the listener. Pratt also denies that the expressiveness of music is due to the listener's empathetic response, citing psychological evidence that the relevant motor mimicry thought to be required for the activation of such empathy is not to be found. (New and quite different forms of evidence in favor of such motor mimicry have been found since the time that Pratt wrote.) Instead, remarking that both music and emotions are dynamic, Pratt suggests that a bit of music has emotional character E by virtue of its sharing a dynamic structure identical with an actual occurrence of emotion E in a sentient creature. This does not by itself make Pratt a resemblance theorist, although he is normally so described. His slogan could as well be read as claiming that music shows how emotions feel, where such showing is to be construed as enabling the listener to acquire or activate a skill rather than knowledge that something is so.

Pratt and Suzanne Langer cite each other's work approvingly, and for this reason the criticisms commonly applied to Langer's work may be thought to carry over to that of Pratt. However, Pratt adopts none of the semiotic trappings of Langer's position, in particular her doctrine that music is a discursive system whose symbols cannot be translated into a natural language such as English. Davies, aware of these differences, nevertheless criticizes Pratt's position as sharing some of the obscurities of Langer's, writing,

Pratt encapsulates his theory in the famous slogan, "Music sounds the way the emotions feel." To this I am inclined to respond both with "of course" and with "What is that supposed to mean?" Pratt's view, like Langer's testifies to the phenomenal character of the experience of music's expressiveness, but in so doing it fails to answer the puzzle that leads one to ask, "How is this possible?" ... the phenomenal similarities between the sound of music and the "form of feelings" seems inadequate to the explanatory task. (1994, p. 136)

I propose to leave aside the question how a philosopher could find a doctrine both platitudinous and obscure. The more important point is that where Pratt's program does seem inadequate, the EST is in a position to

carry the line of explanation further. To see this, consider a footnote of Davies:

In his various writings, Pratt mentions music as possessing the character of being agitated, calm, wistful, dramatic, seductive, restless, pompous, passionate, sombre, triumphant, erotic, exhilarating, martial, pensive, languid, yearning, stately, majestic, lugubrious, ecstatic, sprightly, and aspiring. Of Pratt's examples, I find agitation, restlessness and vacillation to be those most plausibly regarded as possessing a distinctive dynamic character. But I wonder if they are properly called emotions, and if they belong with joy and triumph. (1994, p. 135)

Davies is right that, for instance, calling the music ecstatic raises all of our questions all over again. However, consider the three cases that he does think legitimate. We now know that agitation, restlessness, and vacillation do not need to be emotions in order to make music have an expressive quality. What matters is that such characteristics hold of a piece of music together with other features in such a way as to locate it in a three-space whose dimensions are the continua of pleasant/unpleasant, intense/mild, dynamic/static. Agitation and restlessness are relatively dynamic while the latter tends to be less pleasant. Vacillation tends better to characterize music that is calm for only brief periods without culminating in or recurring to any period of calm that is pleasant.

7.6. Transparency and translucency: expression in representation

Consider a photograph of a mountain scene. I shall follow Walton (1974, 1997) in holding that photos enable us quite literally to perceive what they are photographs of. Thus the photo shows us mountains by enabling us to perceive them; it is a perception-enabling form of showing. It also shows us forests atop those mountains by enabling us to perceive them. The photo, additionally, enables us to perceive a few trees, or at least their outlines, such as those atop the mountain in the middle distance. However, from the premise that I perceive a forest, and the premise that a forest comprises trees, it does not follow that I perceive each tree in the forest that I perceive. Given this photo's resolution and size, there are many trees that we know to be there but that we do not perceive. In that case the photo shows those trees by demonstrating their existence.

In addition to perception-enabling showing and demonstrative showing, the photo provides knowledge of a qualitative kind. For instance, supposing that the photo did not distort its image too much, it also shows us the color of the range. (We return in a moment to the question what to say if the camera used filters or some other manipulative device.) In this respect, too, gazing at a photo is like looking at the scene of which it is a photo. However, photographs also share their ability to show what something looks like with drawings and paintings. A painting of the same mountain range might capture its color as well as the photograph; in fact it may even do better. A drawing or painting can show how something looks, and, in general, the better it does this the more realistic it is. Observe, however, that from the premise that a painting shows how your great-grandmother looked, it does not follow that by looking at the painting you can see your great-grandmother. For this reason, in holding that a painting or drawing shows how something looks, we need not infer that it is "transparent" in Walton's sense of that term.

Representations, then, can contain qualitative and non-qualitative information, and indeed a non-photographic representation like a painting can contain qualitative information even if it does not enable viewers to perceive what it depicts. This comports with the common-sense idea that a faithful portrait painting of an ancestor can show us what she looked like. It can do so without enabling us to see her.

Representations are rich with information in other respects. We saw above that by perceiving a child getting hit by a car I may acquire knowledge of how it feels to be horrified, or that knowledge might be activated in me if it had been dormant. I can similarly acquire, or activate, knowledge of the feeling of calm as I listen to a recording of waves crashing onto a shoreline. Further, just as it is a fact of the human perceptual system that horizontal lines tend to make a thing look wider and vertical lines make it look taller, a recording of the crashing surf tends to be relaxing, and an image of something disgusting can provoke disgust.

Disgust such as this does not require the intervention of belief for its activation. I do not, in particular, need to believe the pictured object to be real in order to feel disgust as I gaze at it. Rather, that disgust can be triggered in an entirely non-doxastic way, just as the slimy slithering on my leg might trigger an automatic response of disgust, fear, or both, as I jump to rid myself of it. Some representations, then, can trigger affective

responses in us without mediation of a belief that what is represented is real or likely to be the case. In so doing they can also give us knowledge how, namely knowledge of how an experience feels.

We can also acquire knowledge how by more cognitively complex means, such as those involving counterfactual reasoning. For instance, if I can imaginatively project myself into the situation represented before me, I may also learn how I would feel in that situation were it actual. That feeling might be new to me, and I may thereby learn something from the representation of a state of affairs leaving aside the question whether it is actual. In addition, even if I am acquainted with that feeling, I might also learn from this experience that situations of *this* sort tend to provoke feelings of that kind.

Example: Imagine a painting of a squalid urban scene. No one seems to have much to do to fill up their time. Most of the storefronts are boarded up, and such establishments as there are offer "payday" loans at rapacious fees or liquor at midday. This painting helps one to imagine what it would be like to live in a situation like this. Not completely; those of us fortunate enough not to live like this can hardly use this photo completely to grasp the monotony, day in and day out, of living in this world. However, a sufficiently sensitive viewer may use this painting to get a sense of what such hopelessness might be like: of how it feels to have no viable prospect of economic advancement; to live amid chronic violence; to have no source of fulfillment other than drugs and drink. A series of such paintings might bring home the point with even more force. By getting a sense of these things the viewer can come to understand how *hopelessness* feels.

It is also natural to say that the painting conveys a sense of hopelessness. It has a hopeless feel to it. I suggest that it is equally true to say that the painting expresses hopelessness. By its means we do not literally perceive hopelessness. (The painting would have its expressive dimension even if we did not see any hopeless people in it.) Further, the painting does give evidence of the presence of hopelessness in or near the subject matter. However, so describing matters does not fully capture the emotional power of the painting. For just giving evidence of hopelessness does not put anyone in a position to know how hopelessness feels. Rather, the painting also *shows how* hopelessness feels, and thereby expresses hopelessness. Here is a way in which representation can have a significant expressive dimension as well.

We noted in Chapter 4 that while some forms of self-expression enable perception of what is shown, they do not enable such perception for all possible observers. Only those observers with the appropriate sensory modalities can perceive what is thereby shown. A deaf person might not hear the trepidation in my voice, while a dog might be the only creature able to perceive my anxiety. An analogous point applies to those cases of self-expression that show how something feels. Only those agents equipped to answer questions of the form, 'How would I feel were I in this situation?' will be able to gain knowledge of how something feels from the cases under discussion here. That includes creatures whose cognitive capacities prevent them from engaging in the counterfactual reasoning just sketched. Even for the cognitively sophisticated, however, one might be able to entertain that counterfactual question without having a clue what its answer might be. For a cartoon example, Mr. Spock could not use the photograph discussed above to get a sense of how hopelessness feels, since it's doubtful that he can imagine himself having emotions or feelings at all. For a more realistic example, one who for one reason or another finds it difficult to imagine herself into the world of the photograph (perhaps because of resistance; she might be distracted with such questions as, 'Why don't they just work harder?', or 'It's either eat or be eaten!') will be unlikely to learn from it how hopelessness feels.

We tend to think of ourselves being called upon to empathize with those suffering rather than those experiencing some pleasant or enjoyable emotion. That is presumably because sufferers tend to solicit our empathy more often than do others. Nevertheless it makes perfectly good sense to empathize with someone feeling a "positive" emotion or mood. So consider the photo from Rodchenko entitled *Pioneer Girl* (see p. 200). Notice that point of light in each of her eyes; that from her hair and the bit of her clothes you see, she's not overdressed for plowing a field or hammering railroad ties. Too, you're looking at her from below, and so it is natural to see her as large and strong. Yet the classical cut of her nose and upper lip suggest nobility. I can't but *admire* the Pioneer Girl. Correlatively, I can now empathize with the admiration that Rodchenko felt for her, or at least the admiration that the persona that his work embodies felt.

This photo shows me a lot of things, then. It shows me the girl, her scarf and tousled hair. It also shows me what *admiration feels like*. Of course

it has a polemical dimension as well, since it aims to convince me that the girl is representative of the coming workers' revolution. However, I can remain neutral on precisely what the girl represents while still admiring her combination of earthy strength and nobility.

A work of art can show me how an emotion feels, then, without that being its primary aim. Also, a work of art can show me how an emotion feels even if I am no stranger to that emotion. I might be acquainted with a certain emotion or mood although I am not able to access it consciously, through disuse, as it were. A work of art can reacquaint me with an emotion or mood by bringing it to consciousness.

Expressiveness and empathy are, then, closely linked. Something that is expressive of an emotion or experience shows how that emotion or experience appears or feels. In so doing, that thing makes know-how available to appropriately constituted and situated observers. When what has been made available is how an emotion or experience feels, such observers are then in a position to employ their imagination in such a way as to empathize with others. While expressiveness in the service of empathy is not the exclusive domain of art, and while a great deal of art aims at nothing of the kind, it nevertheless seems fair to say that *one* central function of artforms as disparate as painting, music, literature, film, and photography is that they show how emotion and experience feel in such a way as to equip us to achieve a greater rapport with others.

Appendix: Definitions and Analyses

Cue:

A *cue* is any feature of an entity that conveys information (including misinformation).

Signal:

A *signal* is any feature of an entity that conveys information (including misinformation) and that was designed for its ability to convey that information. A signal can be sent without being received, and a signal can be received without being interpreted properly, or interpreted at all.

Index:

An *index* is any signal that can only be faked with great difficulty as a result of limitations on the organism.

Handicap:

A *handicap* is a signal that can only be faked with great difficulty as a result of being very costly to produce.

Characterization of Self-Expression:

Where A is an agent and B a cognitive, affective, or experiential state of a sort to which A can have introspective access, A expresses her B if and only if A is in state B, and some action or behavior of A's both shows and signals her B.

Factual Speaker Meaning: Where P is an actual state of affairs, S factually speaker-means that P iff

1. S performs an action A intending that
2. in performing A, it be manifest that P, and that it be manifest that S intends that (2).

Objectual Speaker Meaning: S objectually speaker-means α iff

1. S performs an action A intending
2. α to be manifest, and for it to be manifest that s/he intends (2).

Illocutionary Speaker Meaning: S illocutionarily speaker-means that P φ'ly, where φ is an illocutionary force, iff

1. S performs an action A intending that
2. in performing A, it be manifest that S is committed to P under force φ, and that it be manifest that S intends that (2).

Speaker Meaning: S speaker-means something just in case S either objectually speaker-means something, factually speaker-means something, or illocutionarily speaker-means something.

The Expressiveness-As-Showing Theory: An object O possesses affective or experiential quality E just in case O is a potential source of knowledge of E—either by showing how E characteristically appears, how E characteristically behaves, or how E characteristically feels.

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